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0. Introduction
Cognition is the basis of speech and gesture as co-produced and co-perceived
channels of communication. McNeill (1992) shows the close conceptual linkage
between gesture and speech. Sweetser (1998) notes that gestures which are not co-
semantic with narrative content may function to create discourse meaning, such as
managing speaker turns and manipulating speech contents as metaphorical
objects. Bavelas et al. (1992) distinguish topic gestures, which refer to narrative
content, from interactive gestures, which refer to the interlocutor, for the case of
conversational dialogue.
The linkage between discourse-type cognition and non-narrative gestures, or, 
as I will call them, discourse structuring gestures (DSG, henceforth), has not yet 
been studied. In this paper, I look at DSG form, prosody, and function in political 
argument, and show that DSG in argument systemically differ from those that 
have been observed in conversation. 
 I believe that respective differences stem from the evocation of discourse type 
specific embodied concepts shared by interlocutors, such as primary metaphors 
and related frame inferential structure. While DSG in both conversation (Bavelas 
et al. 1992, Sweetser 1998) and argument (my data) show mappings based on the 
Conduit Metaphor, DSG in argument additionally display specific forms and 
performance modes based on the primary metaphor Argument is Physical Strug-
gle. As for gestural function, it has been observed that non-narrative gestures in 
conversation may serve to “help maintain the conversation as a social system” 
(Bavelas et al. 1992:469), in contrast to conversation as alternating monologues. I 
show that the function of DSG in argument extends to discourse control over 
speaker role and content.  
1. Defining Discourse Structuring Gestures
Whether we talk on the phone or to ourselves, or just go over something in our
minds without speaking, we often gesture as part of our cognitive effort. My
interest lies with DSG and thus gestures that occur in face-to-face communication.
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Kendon (2004) defines gesture as any visible bodily action that creates meaning 
in discourse. Bavelas et al. (1992) distinguish topic and interactive gestures as the 
two subcategories of hand gestures. 
 
1.1. Gesture and Speech Co-Timing 
Topic or narrative gestures can be co-timed with speech and depict or add to 
narrative content. I observe that co-speech DSG frequently relate to utterances 
addressing the interlocutor (cf. speaker defense gestures co-timed with “Let me 
finish”: case (6)). This accords with Bavelas et al.’s (1992) observation that 
paralinguistic interactive gestures have topic independent paraphrases addressing 
the interlocutor. Another type of co-speech DSG that I observe in my data are 
completely unrelated to utterance semantics. However, their co-timing with 
specific speech parts seems crucial for their functions: profiling or enforcing such 
utterance parts that are regarded crucial arguments by the speaker (cf. content 
offence gestures: cases (1) and (2)) and negating ideas formerly introduced by the 
interlocutor (cf. content defense gestures: cases (3), (4), and (5)).  
 
1.2. Synchronized and Complex DSG 
Gesture analyses often focus on hand gestures and Bavelas et al.’s (1992) distinc-
tion of topic and interactive gestures (Bavelas et al. 1992:469). But people gesture 
with many body parts: hands, head, upper body and eyebrows, to only name a 
few. While we may gesture with each independently, I find that many DSG are 
multilayered: Their meaning is a product of co-performed movement of multiple 
body parts. In my data, I observe two types of such gestures.  
 First, movement of different layers may be parallel in form and function, 
stemming from the same embodied concept, e.g., a speaker defense gesture (based 
on Speaking is Forward Movement) performed with hand and head (cf. (6:G3)) 
or, a content offence gesture (based on Communication is Object Transfer) 
performed with head and hand (cf. (2:G2)). The implementation of multiple 
gesture tiers seems to function to increase a gesture’s pragmatic force. They 
frequently co-occur with strong content offence or refusal (cf. (1), (2), and (5)) or 
in the context of a reoccurring struggle over speaker role (cf. (6)). I will call those 
synchronized DSG.  
 Second, body parts may co-gesture but differ in form, contributing different 
semantics and pragmatic functions, e.g., a hand speaker defense gesture and 
synchronic eyebrow crunch, where the first relates to the conceptual metaphor 
Speaking is Forward Movement and signals: ‘stop speaking’ (metaphorically: 
stop moving), while the second is non-metaphorical and signals something along 
the lines of: ‘I am upset by your speaking’ (cf. (6:G2)).1 One may be tempted to 
                                                 
1 Notice the different illocutionary forces of the two co-produced gestures: While the push gesture 
functions much like a direct directive (‘stop speaking’) the eyebrow crunch functions like an 
indirect directive (‘I disapprove of your speaking’). For further discussion see Wehling: Bimodal 
Speech Acts, in work. 
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interpret the hand movement as carrying the main semantic weight and the 
eyebrow movement to be some kind of gestural intensifier. This is not the case: In 
the same discourse event from which the above example is drawn an eyebrow 
crunch is used by the gesturer to signal ‘I am upset by your speaking’, upon which 
the interviewer stops speaking as she rightly interprets the gesture as an indirect 
directive. I will call multilayered gestures whose layers’ movements differ in form 
and do not relate to one single underlying cognitive concept complex DSG. They 
are different from synchronized DSG in that they may combine different illocu-
tionary forces due to form differences on the multiple layers. 
 
1.3. Gesture Prosody 
Whether and how to parse gestural movements into those that contribute to form 
and those that are prosodic is to my knowledge a question that has not yet been 
raised in bimodality studies. One might ask why we should bother to think about 
form and prosody as two levels of gesture, given the vast differences between the 
systems ‘language’ and ‘gesture.’ The reason lies with my interest in argument 
specific DSG. Speech forms in argumentative discourse do not differ from words 
used in other dialogues. Languages have no argument specific lexicon. Aside 
from form frequency, the most salient characteristics of argumentative speech are 
prosodic: intonation, pitch, speech rhythm and so forth. I believe that the same 
holds for gesture, e.g., fend off and push gestures can be used in conversation and 
argument to signal: ‘Let me finish’2 or ‘I refuse what you just said’.3 While such 
forms are more frequent in arguments, highly salient elements of argumentative 
DSG are bound to be prosodic. I expect gesture prosody (or performance mode) to 
relate to those conceptual mappings that shape our overall discourse type cogni-
tion.  
 One needs to decide, then, what elements of gestural movement to consider 
prosodic. An eyebrow crunch co-timed with the repetition of a hand push may at 
first glance seem to function alike speech prosody, such as a higher pitch when 
repeating: “Let me finish” (cf. (6:G2)). However, the eyebrow crunch can inde-
pendently establish meaning (see above). I propose to treat co-gestures that can 
function as autonomous form-meaning pairs as part of multilayered gestures’ 
form. Gesture prosody, then, establishes itself on the level of performance mode: 
bodily intensity (speed, abruptness, force of stroke; tenseness, laxness of gestur-
ing body part) and spatial performance (gesture radius). Increased speed and 
abruptness during the repetition of a hand or upper body push in fact seems to be 
a functional equivalent to a higher pitch and change in speech rhythm during the 
repetition of “Let me finish” (cf. (6:G3)). 
 I ought to be careful not to oversimplify the relationship between speech and 
gesture prosody and the complex matter of how both relate to cognition. The 
notions presented here are tentative. I suspect one finds interesting relationships 
                                                 
2 Conceptual Metaphor: Speaking Is Forward Movement. 
3 Conceptual Metaphor: Conduit Metaphor. 
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between the three when closely examined, e.g., gestural radius could conceptually 
relate to pitch: Louder speech carries, metaphorically, further. A gesture that 
reaches far towards an interlocutor seems to serve the same pragmatic function.  
 
2. Dialogue Subtypes: Metaphorical and Frame Inferential Mappings 
Interlocutors access speech and gesture meaning via shared embodied knowledge, 
such as primary metaphor. Production and perception of speech and gesture 
frequently draw from the same cognitive structures (McNeill 1992, Sweetser 
1998). Gestural mappings have been accounted for in gesture with regard to form: 
“In gesture (…), there are systematic metaphorical mappings (…) remarkably 
parallel to the mappings seen in linguistic usage” (Sweetser 1998:2).  
 My hypothesis for DSG is that how we gesture (form and prosody) and why 
we gesture in a certain way (function) relates to conceptual metaphors and frame 
inferences that structure our discourse type cognition. Commonalities and differ-
ences between DSG in conversation and argument are grounded in respective 
conceptual commonalities and differences. 
 Grady (1997) defines primary metaphors as based on reoccurring subjective 
and sensorimotor experiential correlations. An experiential scenario that gives rise 
to mappings onto the target domain ‘dialogue’ is that of object exchange. As a 
child, you give an object to someone so that he or she can see4 and manipulate5 it. 
Reddy (1979) subsumes the resulting mappings under the Conduit Metaphor: 
Ideas Are Objects, Words Are Containers and Communication Is Object Transfer. 
Examples of linguistic usage are giving and getting ideas (Johnson and Lakoff 
1980). Gestural mappings have been accounted for in conversational dialogue 
where interlocutors use their hands as iconic containers when offering ideas or 
hold hands up as if to stop oncoming objects when refusing ideas (McNeill 1985, 
Sweetser 1998). The conceptualization of argument has its roots in the primary 
metaphor Argument is Physical Struggle: Before language acquisition, interper-
sonal conflict comes in the form of physical struggle (Lakoff and Wehling: 2006). 
Later, physical struggle is accompanied by words. Our understanding of what we 
do when we argue with one another and how we establish control in argumenta-
tive discourse thus directly relates to notions of physical control. Johnson and 
Lakoff (1980) observe how respective mappings structure linguistic forms. In my 
data, I find gestural forms and performance modes that relate systemically to the 
source domain ‘physical struggle’, namely because of their discourse function: 
control over who speaks and what is being said, conceptualized in terms of 
physical control.  
 
3. Data Analysis 
I distinguish two functional classes: offence and defense gestures, regarding 
speaker or content. Both classes are structured by Argument is Physical Struggle 
                                                 
4 Conceptual Metaphor: Knowing Is Seeing. 
5 Conceptual Metaphor: Thinking Is Object Manipulation. 
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and the entailed concept Argument Control is Physical Control. Notice that this 
does not predict that one finds metaphorical form mappings in each gesture. 
Gestures’ form and prosody may “just” stem from the discourse conceptualiza-
tion’s inferential structure and be iconic for the kind of movement one would 
implement when involved in an actual physical struggle. 
 
3.1. Content and Speaker Control Gestures  
Content control gestures are the product of a blending of Argument is Physical 
Struggle and Conduit Metaphor (including the frame inferential performance 
parameters Mode of Content Communication is Mode of Object Transfer). 
 Non-narrative gestures based on the Conduit Metaphor are commonly used in 
conversation to ‘offer’ or ‘refuse’ ideas (Bavelas et al. 1992, Sweetser 1998). 
Their prototypical form is an outstretched hand with an upward facing palm 
(offering ideas) and a raised hand with the palm facing the interlocutor (refusing 
ideas). I observe those gestures in argument. This does not surprise since both 
conversation and argument are subtypes of ‘dialogue’ and respective metaphori-
cal mappings are inherited. However, the domain ‘argument’ has additional frame 
structure that is not part of general dialogue conceptualization. What interest me 
are cases where argumentative content gestures differ in form and prosody from 
those in conversation, based on their pragmatic function.  
 As a result of the blending of the struggle-frame and Conduit Metaphor, ideas 
are conceptualized as harmful objects, as means to gain discourse control. First, 
metaphorical objects are not simply offered. They are pushed towards the inter-
locutor with the intention to ‘harm’, or ‘hit with increased force’ (cf. (1:G) and 
(2:G1/G2)). I call those Content Offence Gestures (COG, henceforth). Second, 
ideas presented by the interlocutor - conceptualized as approaching harmful 
objects - are in the majority of cases not just fended off, but rather pushed back. 
In the most graphic case by using the whole body to push an idea all the way back 
into the interlocutor’s personal space (cf. (5)). I call those Content Defense 
Gestures (CDG, henceforth). 
 Speaker control gestures are structured by Speaking is Forward Movement 
and Argumentative Engagement is Physical Engagement (including frame 
inferential mappings onto the performance mode Mode of Speaking is Mode of 
Movement).  
 Non-narrative gestures based on Speaking is Forward Movement, such as a 
raised hand to signal ‘stop speaking’, have been observed in discourse (Kendon 
1995). Such gestures used in an argument seem to differ in form and prosody 
from those in conversation, based on their discourse function: In argument, the 
kind of movement that leads to physical control is mapped onto the mode of 
gesturing that leads to discourse control. First, speakers are in the majority of 
cases not just fended off (as is the case in less argumentative dialogue) but 
pushed back (cf. (6:G2,G3)). Second, the physical intensity of the gestures and 
their radius seem to increase in correlation with an intensified struggle over 
speaker role (cf. (6)). I call those Speaker Defense Gestures (SDG, henceforth). 
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Boundaries between conversational and argumentative speaker defense gestures 
are gradient. Form and prosody differences may (i) be a result of a shift towards a 
more argumentative discourse or (ii) work towards bringing about that shift. The 
second kind of gestures that stand in conceptual relation to Speaking is Forward 
Movement and Argumentative Engagement is Physical Engagement are those 
that accompany verbal attack: An argumentative attack on the speech tier occurs 
co-timed with an iconic gestural attack (cf. (7)). They are different from COG in 
that they are co-produced with a whole utterance, not single ideas as concrete 
entities. They are also different in form in that they are not iconic object pushes 
but rather sharp points, or ‘stabs’. I call those Speaker Offence Gestures (SOG, 
henceforth). 
 
3.1.1. Content Offence Gestures  
Below, I report three instances of COG: multilayered co-speech pushes (form) 
executed in a sudden and forceful manner with tense gesturing body parts (pros-
ody). All three are synchronized DSG as defined above. Two are performed with 
upper body and head (1:G and 2:G1), one with head and hand (2:G2).  
 
Case (1) 
starting position          G: who (...) demoted            end position 
Utterance tier: And the best guy in the country, Dick Clarke, who got demoted. 
Gesture tier:  upper body / head push 
 
Case (2) 
starting position          G1: against (...) people        G2: against (...)-hood 
Utterance tier: Saddam Hussein had weapons, used weapons of mass destruction, 
   against his own people (G1) against the neighbourhood (G2). 
Gesture tier: (G1)  upper body / head push, lean back to semi-neutral position 




Why should one classify these gestures as COG? The strokes are co-timed, but 
not co-semantic, with a specific utterance part, namely one that is regarded a 
strong argument by the speaker. How do we know, aside from the gestural cue? 
The co-timed speech has prosodic features distinguishing it from the preceding 
utterance. It is produced with a rising intonation and higher pitch (2:G1) and 
higher pitch with slower, punctuated speech rhythm (1:G). In terms of frame 
inferential reasoning, the gestures seem to be conceptualized as functioning to 
push forth crucial ideas (metaphorically: harmful objects) with the intention to 
weaken the interlocutor’s argumentative position (metaphorically: harm by hitting 
with increased force).  
 (1:G), (2:G1) and (2:G2) show the same gestural mappings but implement 
different body parts ((1:G): upper body, head; (2:G1): upper body, head; (2:G2): 
hand, head). In (2:G2), notice the orientation of the gesturer’s hand with regard to 
spatial conceptualization: The palm is directed towards the interlocutor at a height 
and with an orientation so that, if we were to trace the line of a released forward 
moving object, the path endpoint would be the interlocutor’s body, not some point 
within the shared gesture space. This is expected given argument-frame inferen-
tial mappings; the object ought to hit the interlocutor, not the ground. 
 How can we distinguish the above COG from CDG, SDG and SOG? The 
gesturer does not negate an idea prior introduced by the interlocutor, so this is not 
a CDG. The gesturer’s speaker role is unchallenged, so this is not a SDG. The 
pushes are executed in a quick manner at the boundary of the gesturer’s personal 
space. Retreat to (semi-)neutral position is part of the stroke. This makes sense in 
terms of the motor movement we implement when pushing forth objects. The co-
timed speech parts (cf. who got demoted; against his own people; against the 
neighbourhood) seem to be conceptualized as concrete entities, they are part of 
but distinguishable from the overall utterance.  
 How do the gestures relate to embodied knowledge? If we push something we 
do it (i) from a distance without making body contact (the pushes are performed at 
the gesturer’s space boundary; there is no metonymic physical engagement via 
gesture space intrusion as is the case for SOG) and (ii) via a quick and forceful 
forth-back movement that follows the prototypical motor routine for pushing. 
 
3.1.2. Content Defense Gestures 
I will report three cases of CDG. The first is mono-layered and performed with 
the hand (3). The second is complex where the hand gesture shows a mapping 
based on Ideas Are Objects and the head and facial gestures signal something 
along the lines of ‘careful now’ (4). The third is synchronized where upper body, 
hand and head gesture show mappings based on the Conduit Metaphor (5). CDG 
are co-timed with the gesturer’s negation of an idea prior explicitly or implicitly 
introduced by the interlocutor.  
 
 




starting position          G: I (…) Reagan! 
 Utterance tier: Obama: Now, lets talk about Ronald Reagan. What you repeated 
here today is Clinton: No, nah, I did not… Obama: Wait, no, 
Hillary, you just spoke, you just spoke for two minutes! Clinton: I 
did not say anything about Ronal Reagan!  
Gesture tier: left hand raise, palm towards interlocutor 
 
Case (4) 
starting position            G: He (…) now. 
Utterance tier: Clinton: Do you think Richard Clarke has a vigorous attitude 
about Bin Laden? Wallace: Yes, I do. I think he has a variety of 
opinions and loyalties, but yes. Clinton: He has a variety of opin-
ions and loyalties now.  
Gesture tier: right hand raise, head / hand forward downward push 
 
 In case (3), Barack Obama introduces the notion that Hillary Clinton brought 
up the topic of Ronald Reagan: “Now, lets talk about Ronald Reagan (…)”. 
Clinton’s negation “I did not say anything about Ronal Reagan” is co-timed with 
the hand fend off gesture. In case (4), Chris Wallace states that Dick Clarke has 
“a variety of opinions and loyalties”. On the speech tier, Bill Clinton negates: 
“He has a variety of opinions and loyalties now”. The gesture, a head and hand 
forward downward push towards Wallace, ends in co-timing with now after which 
Clinton retreats from Wallace’s gesture space boundary. 
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3.1.3. The Prosody of Content Defense Gestures  
While argumentative COG and conversational content offering gestures differ in 
prototypical form (push versus outstretched hand with upwards facing palm), 
argumentative CDG and conversational content refusal gestures are very similar 
in prototypical form, e.g., a raised hand facing the interlocutor, often followed by 
a, however slight, push. The (gradient) difference between such gestures in 
conversation and argument lies with prosody, especially bodily intensity and 
radius, e.g., in (4), Clinton’s gesture is performed with a very tense hand, overall 
tense body posture and closeness to the interviewer’s gesture space that is re-
markable. He leans in specifically for the gesture. Case (5) further illustrates the 
linkage between discourse conceptualization and content refusal gesture prosody.  
 
Case (5) 
starting position                   G: No, (…)                                up! 
 Utterance tier: Wallace: With respect, if I may. Instead of going through ’93 and 
Clinton: No, no, you asked it, you brought it up, you brought it up! 
 Gesture tier: Upper body forward shift, hands raised, palms facing interlocutor, 
hands brought downwards in interlocutor’s gesture space, left hand 
touches knee, synchronic head push 
 
In (5), Wallace aims to change topic: “Instead of going through ’93…” implying 
that Clinton brought up that topic. Clinton refuses the notion: “No, no, you asked 
it, you brought it up”. The co-timed gesture shows the strongest case of content 
defense we have seen so far. Clinton shifts his upper body towards the interlocu-
tor. His hand push goes into Wallace’s personal space and culminates in body 
contact. In terms of gestural mapping, Clinton not only fends off an oncoming 
object or pushes it back from a distance, he brings it all the way back to the 
interlocutor - as far away from his own body as possible. 
 Thus, content refusal force seems to correlate with both CDG form (cf. fend 
off: (3) versus push: (4)/(5)) and CDG prosody (general tenseness of all the 
strokes, and: gesture radius, compare (4)/(5)). Notice that in (3), Clinton steps into 
the shared gesture space to perform the gesture. In (4)/(5), Clinton leans towards 
Wallace (to different degrees) when performing the stroke. In terms of embodied 
knowledge, in an argument conceptualized as physical struggle, content refusal is 
stronger than in conversational dialogue since ideas put forth by interlocutors are 
metaphorically ‘harmful’ objects, a mean to gain discourse control by weakening 
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the interlocutor’s position. Thus, potentially very crucial ideas (metaphorically: 
very harmful objects) are refused (metaphorically: fended off or pushed back) 
much more strongly and often as far away as possible from one’s body. 
  
3.1.4. Speaker Defense Gestures 
I report three instances of SDG. (6:G1) is mono-layered. (6:G2) is a complex 
gesture, namely a hand push (based on Speaking is Forward Movement), the 
eyebrow crunch signals: ‘I am upset/angry’. (6:G3) is a synchronized gesture, a 




G1: May (…) finish?        G2: Let (…) please.   G3: Let (…) please. 
 Utterance tier: Bush: (…) Saddam Hussein… Interviewer: Indeed Mister 
President, but you didn’t find… Bush: Let me, let me…May I fin-
ish? (G1) (…) Bush: It was a relative calm… Interviewer: But in 
your response to Iraq… Bush: Let me, let me finish, please. (G2) 
(…) Bush: (…) nobody cares more about the death than I do. In-
terviewer: Is there a point at which… Bush: Let me, let me finish.  
Gesture tier: (G1) right hand raised, palm facing interlocutor 
 (G2) right hand raise, forward downward push, eyebrow crunch 
 (G3) right hand raise, forward downward push, increase in force 
and speed, abrupt and fragmented mode, upper body inwards 
downward lean 
 
In all instances Bush is being interrupted by the interviewer. The gestures are co-
timed with either direct directives (G2,G3: “Let me finish”) or an indirect direc-
tive (G1: “May I finish”). The gestures enforce the speech act. Notice that while 
the utterance is non-metaphorical, the gesture is based on Speaking is Forward 
Movement.6 These are SDG, not CDG: First, discourse context and speech act 
clearly indicate a struggle over speaker role, and second, there is no content 
negation. G1 through G3 occur in sequential order. Interestingly, gesture form and 
prosody change in correlation with utterance politeness parameters (indirect to 
                                                 
6 Although not reported in this paper, speech and gesture form may share gestural mapping, e.g.: 
The above gesture co-performed with “Stop right there”, where “there” indicates a mapping based 




direct directive) and prosody (increase in pitch, more segmented speech rhythm). 
Thus, Bush’s directive gains intensity by changing speech form and prosody as well 
as by implementing increasingly ‘strong’ SDG: G1 is a mere mono-layered fend off 
performed with little tenseness and small radius. G2 is a complex SDG, where the 
push is performed with a tense hand and increased radius; the eyebrow crunch 
signals strong disapproval. G3 is a complex SDG where hand, upper body and head 
perform pushes. Notice that we can easily imagine G1 in a conversational setting, 
while G2 and G3 go hand in hand with a shift to a more argumentative dialogue. In 
terms of embodied knowledge, in an argument conceptualized as physical struggle, 
do we merely fend off an oncoming attacker or do we actually decide to push him 
or her back and if so, then how forcefully and how far from our own body?  
 
3.1.5. Speaker Offence Gestures  
I introduce one instance of SOG: A mono-layered right hand sharp pointing 
gesture, or ‘stab’:  
 
Case (7)       
starting position     G: I wanna know (…) do anything    
Utterance tier: I wanna know how many people (G1) in the Bush-Administration 
(stab1) you ask why (stab2) didn’t you (stab3) do anything (stab4) 
Gesture tier: hand reach towards and into interlocutor’s personal space, four 
stabs on sheet with right hand index 
 
In (7), the gesture refers to the question sheet between Wallace’s knees, standing 
metonymically for questions being asked when interviewing members of the Bush 
administration: “I wanna know how many people (...) you ask (...)”. But this is 
more than just a referential pointing gesture. Clinton ‘stabs’ onto the question 
sheet, several times. There is movement into the interlocutor’s personal space and 
physical contact within that space co-timed with a whole utterance. 
 Referential pointing is common in conversational dialogue, e.g. to cite the 
interlocutor (cf. Bavelas et al.: 1992). In argumentative SOG, the interlocutor’s 
personal space is intruded (prosody) and the gestures are classifiable as ‘stabs’ 
rather than pointing (form). In terms of embodied knowledge, the argumentative 
attack is accompanied and enforced by an iconic gestural attack. The inter-
Discourse Structuring Gestures in Argument 
 65
viewer’s gestural response sheds further light onto the inferential structures 
evoked as part of the shared discourse conceptualization: Defense from speech 
(and gesture) attack is physical defense, here in the form of a disengaged body 
posture and hand inwards shield gesture. 
 
4. Conclusion 
I have taken a closer look at the discourse function, form and prosody of non-
narrative gestures in relation to discourse cognition and the conceptualization of 
argument as physical struggle. I introduced a tentative distinction between gesture 
form and prosody for the analysis of DSG and argued that their specificities are a 
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